Prevent route leaks by explicitly defining policy
Guest Post: To avoid route leaks providers need to implement a stricter filtering policy.
Tag: RPKI
Event Wrap: HKNOG 7.0
APNIC supported and participated at HKNOG 7.0 in Hong Kong on 1 March 2019.
RPKI in China
Guest Post: Learn about the past, present and future efforts surrounding the deployment of RPKI in China.
OpenBGPD — Adding diversity to the route server landscape
Guest Post: RPKI origination validation and as-set lookup two of multiple new features added to OpenBGPD.
Krill — a new RPKI Certificate Authority
Guest Post: Generate and publish RPKI cryptographic material to authorize BGP announcements, delegate child certificates, and publish cryptographic material.
MyAPNIC RPKI service now supports AS0 ROA creation
APNIC Members can now run Resource Public Key Infrastructure operations inside MyAPNIC, including generating an ‘AS0’ Route Origin Authorization.
NANOG 74: Securing the routing system
The level of interest in the general topic of routing security peaked at the recent NANOG meeting, with several thought-provoking presentations on the topic.
Complementing community routing efforts
APNIC welcomes your suggestions to help us consider the best approach to addressing ROA inconsistencies.
Mapping RPKI-unreachable IP address space
Guest Post: Research reveals the top ASNs, economies and regions for RPKI-unreachable networks in IPv4 and IPv6 address space.
Cleaning up ROAs inconsistent with the BGP state
Guest Post: Route Origin Validation is gaining popularity, however, the number of broken legacy ROAs causing INVALID prefix-origin pairs is becoming a concern.