Persistent device identity in the era of MAC address randomization
Guest Post: A RADIUS-based framework for stable device identification.
Guest Post: A RADIUS-based framework for stable device identification.
Guest Post: “RADIUS is the protocol that will never die”. So given that RADIUS is staying, what do we need to do to make it secure for the next 30 years?
Guest Post: Many BGP route leaks flagged by automated systems are short-lived artifacts of normal convergence. Doug Madory draws on Cloudflare Radar, RouteViews, and Jared Mauch’s leak detector to show how these ‘ephemeral leaks’ occur, why they rarely disrupt traffic, and why they still matter for routing security.
Guest Post: The Open Fibre Data Standard (OFDS) provides a common way to describe fibre infrastructure as structured, machine-readable data, allowing shared understanding without requiring uniform ownership or control.
Guest Post: From Kubernetes migration to improved ASN comparison and stronger data normalization, PeeringDB has delivered a range of updates over the past six months. This report highlights key operational changes, new search capabilities, and what’s coming next to support users and contributors.
Guest Post: IPv6 can be seen as an infrastructure refresh, rather than an organizational responsibility tied to governance, risk, and compliance. Reframe it in those terms, and it shifts from a network discussion to a board-level obligation.
Guest Post: RPKIViews captures the constantly changing global RPKI dataset without storing wasteful full snapshots. By using CCRs, deduplication, and high-efficiency compression, rpkispools make long-term RPKI research practical at scale.
Guest Post: MNOs lease LEO satellites from SNOs as a cost-effective way for to expand coverage, but cannot guarantee service quality without control over the satellites. Ripple is a competition-driven framework that directly links SNOs’ revenue to the service quality they deliver.
Guest Post: DDoS attacks continue to be a destructive force on the Internet. ReAct was created to provide efficient and effective mitigation against AR-DDoS attacks, when routing is either symmetric or asymmetric.
Guest Post: PITA 30 showed both the risks of insecure routing and the opportunities for rapid improvement in the Pacific, with PITA 31 set as an implementation target.