Guest Post: Small RPKI publication servers comprise a quiet but important part of the Internet’s trust infrastructure. Understanding who operates these servers, and why, helps reveal both strengths and gaps in today’s routing security.
With support now available in MyAPNIC and the Registry API, APNIC Members can publish ASPAs to help detect route leaks and strengthen the integrity of Internet routing.
Internet routing is shifting from IP-based forwarding to name-based decisions, with DNS and intermediaries steering requests. How does this work in practice, and who decides where your request is served from?
Guest Post: How to design and structure BGP Router IDs in IPv6-native networks.
Guest Post: Many BGP route leaks flagged by automated systems are short-lived artifacts of normal convergence. Doug Madory draws on Cloudflare Radar, RouteViews, and Jared Mauch’s leak detector to show how these ‘ephemeral leaks’ occur, why they rarely disrupt traffic, and why they still matter for routing security.
SCION has both supporters and critics, but it faces a major challenge: Replacing BGP while competing in an environment where network decisions are driven more by carrier costs than by strategic priorities.
Guest Post: DDoS attacks continue to be a destructive force on the Internet. ReAct was created to provide efficient and effective mitigation against AR-DDoS attacks, when routing is either symmetric or asymmetric.
Guest Post: PITA 30 showed both the risks of insecure routing and the opportunities for rapid improvement in the Pacific, with PITA 31 set as an implementation target.
Guest Post: An analysis of more than 80 billion updates reveals how ‘noisy’ BGP updates inflate MRT archives, bias measurements, and highlights the need for more careful interpretation of BGP data.
Guest Post: IRR-based filtering at IXPs often breaks the link between prefixes and their legitimate AS, allowing invalid announcements to slip through. This study measures the issue across many IXPs and offers actionable fixes.
