MyAPNIC RPKI service now supports AS0 ROA creation
APNIC Members can now run Resource Public Key Infrastructure operations inside MyAPNIC, including generating an ‘AS0’ Route Origin Authorization.
Tag: RPKI
NANOG 74: Securing the routing system
The level of interest in the general topic of routing security peaked at the recent NANOG meeting, with several thought-provoking presentations on the topic.
Complementing community routing efforts
APNIC welcomes your suggestions to help us consider the best approach to addressing ROA inconsistencies.
Mapping RPKI-unreachable IP address space
Guest Post: Research reveals the top ASNs, economies and regions for RPKI-unreachable networks in IPv4 and IPv6 address space.
Cleaning up ROAs inconsistent with the BGP state
Guest Post: Route Origin Validation is gaining popularity, however, the number of broken legacy ROAs causing INVALID prefix-origin pairs is becoming a concern.
Treating RPKI ROAs as IRR route(6) objects
Guest Post: Using RPKI ROAs as if they are IRR route(6)-objects is a transitional step towards increased security in the routing ecosystem.
IETF 102: An update on securing BGP
Geoff Huston analyses the current state of BGP security mechanisms based on his observations at the IETF 102 meeting.
Measuring the adoption of RPKI Route Origin Validation
Guest Post: A new, open-source platform allows you to assess the current state of Route Origin Validation deployment.
Do IP address transfers impact network operations?
An expert panel at APRICOT 2018 examined potential issues around cross-region address resource management, including transfers, whois accuracy and geolocation data.
Updating RPKI trust anchor configuration
APNIC has completed the process of transitioning to a new RPKI single trust anchor configuration.