Guest Post: Small RPKI publication servers comprise a quiet but important part of the Internet’s trust infrastructure. Understanding who operates these servers, and why, helps reveal both strengths and gaps in today’s routing security.
Guest Post: How to design and structure BGP Router IDs in IPv6-native networks.
Guest Post: Identifying active IPv6 addresses helps assess deployment, reveal gaps, and detect vulnerable devices. Subnet-Router Anycast (SRA) probing removes the need for prior knowledge of address allocation.
Job Snijders discusses the new ‘Erik’ protocol for faster RPKI repository synchronization.
Guest Post: “RADIUS is the protocol that will never die”. So given that RADIUS is staying, what do we need to do to make it secure for the next 30 years?
Guest Post: Many BGP route leaks flagged by automated systems are short-lived artifacts of normal convergence. Doug Madory draws on Cloudflare Radar, RouteViews, and Jared Mauch’s leak detector to show how these ‘ephemeral leaks’ occur, why they rarely disrupt traffic, and why they still matter for routing security.
Geoff Huston discusses the CIDR Report, a 30-year-long series of data about who is sending excess data in BGP. Does the CIDR Report still hold value?
‘Revocation is broken’ is a catchphrase in the world of certificates and Certificate Authorities. Certification infrastructure may not have been designed for the Internet of today.
Guest Post: Analysing public BGP data to characterize the real‑world behaviour of five major scrubbing services.
Guest Post: What can we learn about QUIC deployments just by listening to unsolicited QUIC traffic? As it turns out, quite a lot.
