[Podcast] The Erik protocol: Improving RPKI data fetch
Job Snijders discusses the new ‘Erik’ protocol for faster RPKI repository synchronization.
Job Snijders discusses the new ‘Erik’ protocol for faster RPKI repository synchronization.
Guest Post: Many BGP route leaks flagged by automated systems are short-lived artifacts of normal convergence. Doug Madory draws on Cloudflare Radar, RouteViews, and Jared Mauch’s leak detector to show how these ‘ephemeral leaks’ occur, why they rarely disrupt traffic, and why they still matter for routing security.
APNIC and NNIX have signed an MoU to advance RPKI and IPv6 deployment in China, including plans for an RPKI repository mirror in Hangzhou — the first of its kind in the region. The partnership combines infrastructure, training, and community engagement to support a more secure and resilient regional Internet.
Guest Post: RPKIViews captures the constantly changing global RPKI dataset without storing wasteful full snapshots. By using CCRs, deduplication, and high-efficiency compression, rpkispools make long-term RPKI research practical at scale.
Guest Post: PITA 30 showed both the risks of insecure routing and the opportunities for rapid improvement in the Pacific, with PITA 31 set as an implementation target.
Guest Post: Analysing public BGP data to characterize the real‑world behaviour of five major scrubbing services.
Strengthening routing security is increasingly critical, and APNIC’s tools are helping operators protect their networks with clearer, more reliable validation and visibility.
Guest Post: IRR-based filtering at IXPs often breaks the link between prefixes and their legitimate AS, allowing invalid announcements to slip through. This study measures the issue across many IXPs and offers actionable fixes.
APNIC welcomed delegates from Xiong’an New Area to present the IPv6 City Plaque and discuss continued technical cooperation. The visit highlighted Xiong’an’s large‑scale IPv6 deployment and its 2026 Future City competitions.
Guest Post: A short BGP hijack in 2025 showed how routing security can fail when attackers exploit weaknesses in provider onboarding.