Treating RPKI ROAs as IRR route(6) objects
Guest Post: Using RPKI ROAs as if they are IRR route(6)-objects is a transitional step towards increased security in the routing ecosystem.
Tag: RPKI
IETF 102: An update on securing BGP
Geoff Huston analyses the current state of BGP security mechanisms based on his observations at the IETF 102 meeting.
Measuring the adoption of RPKI Route Origin Validation
Guest Post: A new, open-source platform allows you to assess the current state of Route Origin Validation deployment.
Do IP address transfers impact network operations?
An expert panel at APRICOT 2018 examined potential issues around cross-region address resource management, including transfers, whois accuracy and geolocation data.
Updating RPKI trust anchor configuration
APNIC has completed the process of transitioning to a new RPKI single trust anchor configuration.
Increasing RPKI at a national level
A national RPKI awareness and deployment project being carried out in Colombia has so far increased the economy’s RPKI deployment to over 46%.
LACNIC 28: Becoming a ‘hackathonholic’
LACNIC’s first Hackathon awards tool that visualizes RPKI deployment of BGP neighbours.
CNNIC’s RPKI deployment experience
Guest Post: After a carefully planned rollout, CNNIC is now offering its RPKI service to its members.
RPSTIR: A Relying Party Security Technology for Internet Routing
Guest Post: Dr Di Ma briefly describes the implementation of open source RPKI Relying Party software, RPSTIR.
Transitioning to a single trust anchor
APNIC is transitioning from the current set of five Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) trust anchors to a single “all resources” trust anchor in an effort to streamline the RPKI process.