Route management prevalidation
MyAPNIC users will soon receive warnings if they attempt to submit route management changes that would cause any of their current BGP announcements to be considered ‘RPKI-invalid’.
Tag: ROV
Notes from RIPE 83
Geoff Huston discusses technical presentations from RIPE 83.
What’s your wish list for the perfect RPKI validator?
There are many RPKI validators to choose from. If you could mix and match features, what would your ideal validator look like?
Solo effort to clean up RPKI invalids across a region
Guest Post: What happens when one person tries to convince network operators to apply MANRS actions across the AFRINIC region?
RPKI invalids are not going away
Guest Post: How do we fix invalid RPKI routes and whose job is it?
The RIPE NCC’s experience introducing ROV to its own network
Guest Post: RIPE NCC recently introduced ROV on their own network. How’s it going and why did they do it?
Does training impact RPKI usage?
Take a deep dive into the ROA figures and the dates of training events to see how they match up.
RPKI ReadTheDocs
Guest Post: Community-driven documentation makes sense of RPKI.
A survey on securing inter-domain routing: Part 2
What can we take from past experiences at securing BGP to mitigate growing number of attacks on it?
Cleaning up your RPKI invalid routes
Fixing your incorrect or outdated ROAs is easy — here’s how.