The scourge of excessive AS-SETs
Guest Post: Many AS-SETs have grown so large they effectively whitelist most of the routing table, defeating their purpose. How are AS-SETs actually used for filtering, and what can be done when they get too big?
Guest Post: Many AS-SETs have grown so large they effectively whitelist most of the routing table, defeating their purpose. How are AS-SETs actually used for filtering, and what can be done when they get too big?
Guest Post: Reviewing the latest RPKI ROV deployment metrics in light of a major milestone.
Guest Post: Investigating the unique manipulation of RPKI used in Orange España’s recent outage.
Guest Post: Investigating the historical impact of undersea landslides on submarine cables.
Guest Post: These attacks hold lessons for securing the BGP routing of any organization that conducts business on the Internet.
Guest Post: Prepending-to-all is a self-inflicted and needless risk that serves little purpose.
Guest Post: A Swiss data centre leaked over 70,000 routes to China Telecom, some for over two hours.
Guest Post: Read how one email to a NOG mailing list led to a concerted effort to kick a notorious BGP hijacker off the Internet.