RPKI vs social engineering: A case study in route hijacking
Guest Post: A short BGP hijack in 2025 showed how routing security can fail when attackers exploit weaknesses in provider onboarding.
Guest Post: A short BGP hijack in 2025 showed how routing security can fail when attackers exploit weaknesses in provider onboarding.
The AGM provides an opportunity to learn more about APNIC and to ask questions of the EC.
Guest Post: Job Snijders explores how the use of RPKI to secure Internet routing grew and evolved over 2025.
Geoff Huston shares his notes from attending NANOG 96.
Guest Post: RDAP, the more modern replacement for whois, has matured, and adoption is growing rapidly.
A trick that lets you map an IP address to an ASN without preprocessing any data.
Exploring how Indonesia’s unique geography, policy direction, and technical community are shaping one of the Asia Pacific’s most significant Internet ecosystems. Rapid digital expansion, growing infrastructure investment, and an increasingly active operator community are driving progress, even as challenges remain.
MyAPNIC now supports RPKI Signed Checklists (RSCs), providing Members with a new way to cryptographically sign and verify documents using their RPKI resources. Your feedback is welcome.
The latest measurements on APNIC’s whois, RDAP, RPKI, IRR, and rDNS are now available.
The use of RPKI to secure Internet routing is increasingly standard practice. While there were many significant events in the region throughout 2025, readers maintained an interest in local, regional, and global RPKI stories throughout the year.