DOA: Using RPKI to drive out bad traffic
DOA is a new proposal to improve on the RPKI model by providing clear, authenticated proof of the intent by address delegates.
DOA is a new proposal to improve on the RPKI model by providing clear, authenticated proof of the intent by address delegates.
Securing routing by adopting RPKI is now an essential practice in the modern Internet — here are three of 2021’s top posts.
Guest Post: Is it possible to disrupt RPKI Relying Party software by introducing a malicious CA/repository into the tree?
Guest Post: RPKI updates need to work their way through certificate chains to a handful of ASes. What if they were more spread out?
The third post in this series examines the risks in BGP that make it important to ‘trust but verify’.
Twitter has begun Route Origin Authorization. Here’s what that actually means.
There are many RPKI validators to choose from. If you could mix and match features, what would your ideal validator look like?
Guest Post: What happens when one person tries to convince network operators to apply MANRS actions across the AFRINIC region?
Guest Post: How do we fix invalid RPKI routes and whose job is it?
Guest Post: RIPE NCC recently introduced ROV on their own network. How’s it going and why did they do it?