The scourge of excessive AS-SETs
Guest Post: Many AS-SETs have grown so large they effectively whitelist most of the routing table, defeating their purpose. How are AS-SETs actually used for filtering, and what can be done when they get too big?
Guest Post: Many AS-SETs have grown so large they effectively whitelist most of the routing table, defeating their purpose. How are AS-SETs actually used for filtering, and what can be done when they get too big?
The latest measurements on APNIC’s whois, RDAP, RPKI, IRR, and rDNS are now available.
Securing routing by adopting RPKI is now an essential practice in the modern Internet — here are three of 2024’s top posts.
Examining Internet routing security policies across three key sectors in Pakistan.
Guest Post: Proposing and validating a workflow to identify suspicious IRR records.
Guest Post: How IRR explorer can be used to analyse and improve routing, IRR registrations, and RPKI configurations.
Guest Post: Which Internet Routing Registry database has the most accurate information?
Whois is old and clunky. In many ways, RDAP already fulfils many of its functions. So are we ready to replace it?
The level of interest in the general topic of routing security peaked at the recent NANOG meeting, with several thought-provoking presentations on the topic.
RPSL changes at the RIPE NCC on 4 September will affect APNIC region resource holders.