A survey on securing inter-domain routing: Part 2
What can we take from past experiences at securing BGP to mitigate growing number of attacks on it?
What can we take from past experiences at securing BGP to mitigate growing number of attacks on it?
A major ongoing concern related to the BGP is its lack of effective security measures.
Guest Post: A framework that overcomes the problem in IP-to-AS mapping.
Guest Post: NIST’s RPKI Monitor is an online test and measurement system for emerging BGP security technologies.
Guest Post: AS55410 mistakenly announced more than 30,000 BGP prefixes, highlighting the need to implement effective route filtering.
Guest Post: Exploring common knowledge gaps in RPKI and how to address them.
Now that we know what it means to be an ASN, how do we count them?
What does it ‘mean’ to be an AS number?
Guest post: In 2014, there were problems when the IPv4 Internet routing table hit 512k routes. What will happen when it hits 1024k?
There are plenty of alternatives for RPKI validation.