Preventing route leaks made simple: BGP roleplay with Junos (RFC 9234)
Guest Post: For 35 years, accidental BGP route leaks and hijacks have been routine — a simple tweak, now defined in RFC 9234, could have prevented most of them.
Guest Post: For 35 years, accidental BGP route leaks and hijacks have been routine — a simple tweak, now defined in RFC 9234, could have prevented most of them.
External ISP network disruptions, triggering QUIC, BGP path attributes, and a regional standards forum?
Guest Post: What happens when IXPs fail and why classifying them as critical infrastructure is a necessity.
Geoff Huston analyses a single, regular, day of BGP activity to explore what it reveals about the state and stability of global Internet routing.
Doug Madory shares insights from his 2025 analysis of secure BGP deployment around the world, based on Kentik’s internal measurements and global routing data.
Guest Post: Many AS-SETs have grown so large they effectively whitelist most of the routing table, defeating their purpose. How are AS-SETs actually used for filtering, and what can be done when they get too big?
A recent routing incident sparks renewed debate on protocol design, error handling, and whether Postel’s law is helping or hurting the Internet’s evolution.
What an ordinary Thursday reveals about Internet routing from the edge.
Guest Post: Evaluating the current state of BGPsec implementations with hands-on experiments.
Professor Cristel Pelsser discusses GILL, a new model for BGP data collection, and the application of Machine Learning to BGP analysis.